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도널드 콘 연준리 부의장, '경제전망' 연설(원문)

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※ 번역할 언어 선택

Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn
At the National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems Annual Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana
May 20, 2008

The Economic Outlook

These have been challenging times for the U.S. economy. Homebuilding and house prices have gone through prolonged and deep declines; the resulting broad pullback in financial markets from risk-taking and credit extension has transmitted some of the weakness in the housing sector to other types of spending. At the same time, a substantial run-up in the prices of petroleum and other commodities has simultaneously increased inflation and damped spending on other goods and services. I don't need to tell you that challenging times for the economy are also challenging times for those entrusted with managing pension funds. So I thought you might find it useful this morning for me to review where I think the economy is and where it might be going. That, in turn, depends critically on developments in financial markets, and I'll have something to say about those developments as well. Finally, I'll end with a few thoughts about what the recent turbulence in financial markets may imply for the administration of public pension funds.1

Recent Economic Developments
Economic activity this year has been quite sluggish. The weakness in activity continues to be shaped by the fallout from the contraction in housing markets that began two years ago. The demand for housing continued to decline early this year, and sales could fall even further in coming months, given the tightness in mortgage lending. Nonprime mortgages have all but disappeared from the mortgage market. Moreover, with only limited securitizations of prime jumbo loans, rates on those loans are relatively high, and their share of total originations has shrunk significantly since last July. Rates for fixed-rate conforming loans have dropped to close to 6 percent. But even there, the good news is tempered somewhat because, with delinquencies on prime mortgages rising, the government-sponsored enterprises have tightened their standards for conforming loans and added fees for borrowers with lower credit scores and less collateral. All prominent measures of house prices are now showing declines. Although lower prices would eventually help bolster housing demand, the expectations of further declines in prices may currently be exacerbating the difficulties in housing markets.

In this environment, homebuilders have made only limited progress in reducing the very large overhang of unsold new homes despite having cut starts to a level not seen since early 1991. Single-family starts fell to an annual rate of 690,000 in April; the pace of new activity has now dropped by a 1/2 million units in each of the past two years. The supply of existing homes on the market also remains quite high and is likely to be augmented in coming months by rising foreclosures. As a result, further cuts in construction appear to be in train.

The sharp contraction in housing was at the center of the slowdown in economic activity that began late last year. By early this year, however, the spillovers from the housing market correction onto other sectors of the economy began to show through more clearly; consumer and business spending, which had slowed at the end of 2007, has remained on a shallow trajectory since then.

In particular, spending on consumer goods, including new motor vehicles, has been soft. Since last fall, rising prices for energy and food have made a significant dent in the purchasing power of consumers' incomes. Moreover, despite some improvement in the stock market recently, households' net worth has deteriorated since the beginning of the year as the prices of homes have declined; and credit conditions have tightened. In reaction to these adversities, households seem to have become extremely downbeat about prospects for jobs and income.

Business spending for equipment and software edged down in the first quarter, and the environment for capital spending remains difficult; businesses are uncertain about the economic outlook, and lenders have adopted more stringent lending standards. However, while conditions are quite tight for riskier firms, credit does appear to be more readily available to investment-grade businesses.

More difficult financing conditions also seem to be leaving an imprint on nonresidential construction, which now appears to be softening after a couple of years of sharp gains. According to our April Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, a large majority of banks, which are the largest provider of commercial mortgages, reported tightening standards on commercial real estate over the preceding three months.2 The issuance of securitized commercial real estate loans, which funds a little more than one-fourth of all outstanding commercial mortgages, has slowed to a trickle. Sales of commercial properties fell sharply in the first quarter, and late last year prices appeared to have begun to decline.

A bright spot has been the external sector. Although the pace of real activity in some foreign economies also appears to be slowing, the overall rate of expansion in our trading partners--especially emerging Asian economies such as China--remains solid. Some of the pullback in U.S. demand has been absorbed by declines in imports, and the decline in the dollar has made U.S. firms more competitive in export markets, though it has also accentuated inflation concerns.

The deceleration in economic activity has been reflected in the labor market, where layoffs have risen and hiring has slowed. Payroll employment has now fallen for four consecutive months. The combination of job losses and the greater difficulty in finding jobs has pushed the unemployment rate up to 5 percent in recent months.

Financial Market Developments
As I've just noted, the tightening of financial conditions as a result of stresses in financial markets has been an important factor in the recent slowdown of the U.S. economy. In recent weeks, however, U.S. financial markets have improved somewhat. Equity prices have risen noticeably since mid-March. Spreads on both investment-grade and speculative-grade corporate bonds have generally narrowed over the same period, and investment-grade companies, including financial institutions, have been able to raise funds in credit markets. Financial intermediaries have also tapped equity markets to bolster capital depleted by the recognition of losses on loans and securities.

Clearly, some of the extraordinary increase in risk aversion that we saw earlier this year has been reversed. Apparently, a combination of factors has contributed to a perception that financial markets and the economy are less likely than some had feared to experience very adverse outcomes: Among those factors were Federal Reserve actions to bolster liquidity and ease monetary policy, the success of a number of financial institutions in raising capital, and incoming economic data and earnings reports that were not as weak as market participants had expected.

Still, the persistence of relatively wide spreads in many markets suggests that investors continue to be worried about credit quality; the issuance of speculative-grade bonds has been scant this year; and securitization markets for many types of mortgages continue to be impaired. In addition, term bank funding markets remain under pressure as banks and other lenders in these markets conserve capital and liquidity and limit risk-taking. Banks have further tightened lending standards across a wide range of business and consumer loans.

These findings generally suggest that market participants remain wary, and in that environment, improvements in financial markets are vulnerable to negative news on the economy or the extent of credit losses. I expect further, but gradual, improvement in financial markets. Credit flows need to be re-channeled and re-intermediated with less leverage, less rollover risk, and greater compensation for taking risk than before the turmoil began last year. Securitized assets need to be simpler, more transparent, and less reliant on the imprimatur of a credit rating agency. Lenders and other investors need to gain greater confidence that they understand the extent and incidence of the losses arising from the lax lending practices of recent years and the current economic slowdown. Those processes are likely to be slow and they may be set back from time to time, but they will ultimately succeed in giving us a more robust financial system than we had a year ago.

The Economic Outlook
Although the current financial and economic situation remains quite difficult, I believe that the most likely scenario over the next year or so is one in which economic activity firms during the second half of this year and then gathers some strength in 2009. In the near term, consumer spending is likely to receive a boost from the rebates that are now flowing to taxpayers. Although the timing and the magnitude of the spending response are uncertain, economic studies of the previous experience suggest that a noticeable proportion of households respond reasonably quickly to temporary cash flows. Of course, the stimulus to domestic production will depend on the extent to which the additional demand is met by a temporary drawdown of inventories or an increase in imports rather than by an expansion in domestic output. But to date, businesses appear to be keeping tight control on inventories, and a reasonable assumption is that we will see a temporary lift to the economy in coming months.

The pace of activity should continue to improve next year, with an important part of the gains coming from the abatement of the forces currently restraining activity. That said, a number of factors suggest that the recovery could be relatively moderate. I've already mentioned my expectation that financial market functioning and risk appetites will continue to improve, but that recuperation will require some time. As all that happens, the policy easing the Federal Reserve has put in place over recent months will begin to show through more in reductions in the cost of capital and the greater availability of credit. The demand for housing is not likely to rebound substantially for a while after this episode, but the drag on growth from declining activity and prices in the housing market will ebb as excess inventories are worked off and affordability improves. Consumption should pick up along with the improvement in jobs and income, though a gradual increase in the saving rate would be expected now that households will no longer be counting on increases in the value of their homes to finance retirement or other future spending. With a lag, business investment should turn up as prospects for a sustained expansion of economic activity become clearer. And both households and businesses should benefit from a leveling-off in the prices of energy and other commodities along the path implied by futures markets.

As with any forecast, mine is subject to a number of uncertainties. One is the extent of the housing correction ahead of us. If the retrenchment in house prices becomes deeper than anticipated, its effect on lenders and financial markets could further damp overall economic activity. We are in uncharted waters when the financial system becomes so disrupted, though we should consider ourselves fortunate that we have very few similar historical episodes on which to base our judgments. In such circumstances, uncertainty about how credit conditions will evolve and how businesses and households will react to changing terms and conditions means that we can have even less confidence than usual in our economic forecasts.

Inflation
Another area of concern is the implications for inflation as a result of the recent run-up in the prices of energy, food, and other commodities. The recent news on inflation has been mixed. Core inflation has moderated a little so far this year. However, we have seen no relief from the pressures of rising prices for energy and food; thus headline inflation has been quite elevated. These prices have continued to rise despite slowing demand in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in other countries. Over the past few years, emerging market economies have increased demand for many of these commodities, and world supply has not kept pace with this growing demand. For oil, non-OPEC production, particularly in the North Sea and in Mexico, has proved disappointing, and OPEC production has remained restrained. As for food prices, bad weather has combined with higher production costs to restrain supplies. Consequently, agricultural inventories have been drawn down to low levels and have not been available to absorb the rising demand. Furthermore, higher energy prices have affected agricultural prices not only through higher costs of production but also by boosting the demand for biofuels.

Some observers have questioned whether the news on fundamentals affecting supply and demand in commodities markets has been sufficient to justify the sharp price increases in recent months. Some of these commentators have cited the actions of the Federal Reserve in reducing interest rates as an important consideration boosting commodity prices. To be sure, commodity prices did rise as interest rates fell. However, for many commodities, inventories have fallen to all-time lows, a development that casts doubt on the premise that speculative demand boosted by low interest rates has pushed prices above levels that would be consistent with the fundamentals of supply and demand. As interest rates in the United States fell relative to those abroad, the dollar declined, which could have boosted the prices of commodities commonly priced in dollars by reducing their cost in terms of other currencies, hence raising the amount demanded by people using those currencies. But the prices of commodities have risen substantially in terms of all currencies, not just the dollar. In sum, lower interest rates and the reduced foreign exchange value of the dollar may have played a role in the rise in the prices of oil and other commodities, but it probably has been a small one.

The rise in commodity prices presents particular challenges for monetary policy because such increases both add to near-term inflationary pressures and damp demand. A tendency for increases in commodity prices to become a factor in ongoing pricing and wage-setting more generally would be a worrisome development that would over time tend to undermine economic welfare.

In the near term, headline inflation is likely to continue to be boosted by the direct effects of the recent increases in the prices of energy and food. If, as futures markets suggest, those prices level off later this year, prospects seem reasonably good for headline inflation to move back in line over time with core inflation. And I expect core inflation to ease off slowly as commodity prices level out and as economic slack creates competitive conditions that inhibit increases in labor costs and prices. Despite the elevated headline inflation of the past four years, we have seen little evidence of faster wage inflation. And healthy gains in productivity have helped to hold down labor cost pressures on prices.

My expectations for moderating inflation and limited spillover effects from commodity price increases depend critically on the continued stability of inflation expectations. In that regard, year-ahead inflation expectations of households have increased this year in response to the jump in headline inflation. Of greater concern, some measures of longer-term inflation expectations appear to have edged up. If longer-term inflation expectations were to become unmoored--whether because of a protracted period of elevated headline inflation or because the public misinterpreted the recent substantial policy easing as suggesting that monetary policy makers had a greater tolerance for inflation than previously thought--then I believe that we would be facing a more serious situation.

Monetary Policy
The Federal Open Market Committee will be monitoring inflation developments closely for any sign that our longer-run objective of promoting price stability is threatened. At the same time, we also need to continue to carefully assess whether, after a period of near-term softness in economic activity, the economy is likely to be on track for sustained economic expansion over time. With the information now in hand, it is my judgment that monetary policy appears to be appropriately calibrated for now to promote both rising employment and moderating inflation over the medium term. But a large measure of uncertainty surrounds that judgment and as the economy evolves, so will the appropriate stance of policy.

Lessons for Public Pension Systems
Now let me shift my focus to what pension fund managers might glean as lessons learned from the recent turmoil in financial markets and some of the structural challenges that lie ahead. From what we have seen so far, public pension systems generally appear to have avoided the worst of the damage resulting from the recent tumult. For example, while a number of public funds evidently held structured credit products such as collateralized debt obligations, the overall level of exposure to those products appears to have been relatively small.

Nonetheless, the recent experience does point up some serious considerations as pension funds address the challenges in meeting their obligations in coming years. One is that public pension systems--like all investors--need to be diligent about understanding and managing the risks on their balance sheets. Too many investors seem to have placed too much faith in credit rating agencies, and too few seem to have developed their own views of the risks embedded in their holdings. Of course, developing such views is no small undertaking. But if ever a demonstration of the value of doing so were needed, the recent episode certainly provides it.

Perhaps the biggest challenge facing public pension systems is inadequate funding. Even by current measures of liability, which themselves may not be fully revealing, last year about three-fourths of public pension systems were underfunded, and about one-third were funded at less than 80 percent. Lengthening life expectancies and tight public budgets are making existing pension promises ever more difficult to keep--and the problem is significantly magnified if promised health benefits are included.

The funding situation puts systems under a great deal of pressure to reach for higher returns by investing in riskier assets. But as has been so clearly and forcefully demonstrated over the past year, there is no free lunch with risk-taking: The price is volatility, the extent of which should be well disclosed and the implications of which should be well understood.

The generally high weight on equity and real estate investments in the typical public pension fund portfolio has increased in recent years. Part of that exposure has come from increased investment in private equity, real estate investment trusts, and hedge funds. Indeed, some funds have allocated 25 percent or more of their portfolios to these "alternative" categories.

With exposures like those, public pension systems should maintain formal risk-management procedures that are independent of the selection and evaluation of managers and that are carefully designed to minimize conflicts of interest that can weaken the risk-management function.

I mentioned earlier that current measures of pension liabilities might be less than fully revealing. Why might that be so? The chief reason is that public pension benefits are essentially bullet-proof promises to pay. We all have read about instances in which benefits were lost when a private-sector pension sponsor declared bankruptcy and terminated the plan. In the public sector, that just hasn't happened, even when the plan sponsor has run into serious financial difficulty. For all intents and purposes, accrued benefits have turned out to be riskless obligations. While economists are famous for disagreeing with each other on virtually every other conceivable issue, when it comes to this one there is no professional disagreement: The only appropriate way to calculate the present value of a very-low-risk liability is to use a very-low-risk discount rate.

However, most public pension funds calculate the present value of their liabilities using the projected rate of return on the portfolio of assets as the discount rate. This practice makes little sense from an economic perspective. If they shift their portfolio into even riskier assets, does the value of the liabilities backed by their taxpayers go down? Financial economists would say no, but the conventional approach to pension accounting says yes. Unfortunately, the measure of liabilities that results from this process has a real consequence: It pushes the burden of financing today's pension benefits onto future taxpayers, who will be called upon to fund the true cost of existing pension promises.

Another challenge that everyone involved in public pensions faces is the issue of transparency. Unlike private pension funds, public pension systems do not account for liabilities in a standardized way. As a result, public employees, taxpayers, municipal bond investors, credit rating agencies, and other market participants have a hard time comparing funding levels across systems and over time.

What steps can pension funds take to improve transparency and help clarify their long-run challenges? Ideally, they would disclose a standardized measurement of funding status, using consistent and appropriate measures of liability. They might also disclose how their asset allocation affects the volatility of the returns on their assets and how their funding ratios and cash flow might be affected by various outcomes in the financial markets. Such practices almost surely would be welcomed externally. But they might also pay dividends internally, because the funds might find that the information about the volatility built into their systems changes their views about the amount of risk they want to shoulder.

Public pension funds hold more than $3 trillion in assets and cover nearly 20 million workers and retirees. Those funds are clearly vital to the business of state and local governments across the country as well as to the public employees they cover. The potential improvements I have touched on today--adhering to best practices with regard to risk management and grappling with some of the difficult structural issues that currently face public pension systems--would help strengthen public pension systems and should minimize the risks to public employees, the governments that employ them, and the taxpayers that finance them both now and in the future.

Footnotes

1. Paul Smith, David Wilcox, and Joyce Zickler, of the Board's staff contributed to the preparation of these remarks. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of other members of the Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.

2. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2008), "The April 2008 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices" (April).

※출처: Federal Reserve

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[뉴스핌 베스트 기사]

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日 장기금리 3% 목전 [서울=뉴스핌] 오영상 기자 = 일본 장기금리가 3% 선을 눈앞에 두고 있다. 일본은행(BOJ)의 추가 금리인상 관측이 확산하면서 국채 매도세가 이어진 영향이다. 31일 도쿄 채권시장에서 장기금리의 지표인 신규 발행 10년물 국채 수익률은 한때 2.950%까지 상승했다. 전 거래일보다 0.030%포인트 오른 수준으로, 1996년 9월 이후 약 30년 만의 최고치를 다시 경신했다. 시장에서 심리적 저항선으로 여겨지는 대표적 기준선인 3%까지는 불과 0.05%포인트를 남겨두고 있다. 채권 시장에서는 BOJ가 이르면 9월 금융정책결정회의에서 추가 금리인상에 나설 것이라는 전망이 강해지고 있다. 금리 상승을 예상한 투자자들이 국채 매도를 늘리는 한편 신규 매수를 주저하면서 장기금리에 상승 압력이 커지고 있다. 미국의 금리인상 가능성이 다시 부각된 것도 일본 국채시장에 영향을 미쳤다. 미 연방준비제도(FRB)의 케빈 워시 의장은 28일 잭슨홀 회의에서 기조적 인플레이션이 2% 목표를 웃도는 상황이 이어진다면 추가 대응이 필요하다는 취지로 발언했다. 이에 미국 금리가 상승하고 달러 매수가 강해지면서 엔화는 달러당 160엔대까지 하락했다. 엔화 약세가 다시 강해지면서 BOJ의 추가 금리인상 필요성이 커질 것이라는 관측도 확산하고 있다. 지난달 말 미국과 일본이 엔화를 매수하는 공동 외환시장 개입에 나선 이후 시장에서는 엔저를 억제하기 위해 BOJ가 금리인상 속도를 높일 수 있다는 전망이 힘을 얻었다. 시장이 반영하는 9월 금융정책결정회의의 금리인상 확률도 이미 80%를 넘어선 것으로 나타났다. BOJ 내부의 매파적 분위기도 시장의 금리인상 기대를 뒷받침하고 있다. 히미노 료조 부총재는 27일 금리인상과 관련해 "다음 회의를 포함해 매번 금융정책결정회의에서 충분히 검토해 나가겠다"고 밝혔다. 9월 인상을 명시적으로 예고하지는 않았지만 조기 금리인상 가능성을 부정하지 않은 셈이다. 일본 정부의 적극적인 재정정책에 따른 국채 공급 증가 우려도 장기금리 상승 요인으로 꼽힌다. 재정지출 확대를 위해 국채 발행이 늘어날 경우 시장에서 국채를 소화하기 위해 더 높은 금리를 요구할 가능성이 있기 때문이다. 일본 재정에 대한 경계감이 커지면서 장기 국채에 대한 투자자들의 매수세가 약해지고 있다는 분석이다. 시장의 관심은 이제 일본 10년물 국채 금리가 심리적 저항선인 3%를 넘어설지에 쏠리고 있다. BOJ의 추가 긴축 기대와 엔화 약세, 적극재정에 따른 재정 우려가 동시에 이어질 경우 장기금리의 상승 압력은 당분간 지속될 가능성이 있다. [사진=블룸버그] goldendog@newspim.com 2026-08-31 11:01
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월가를 달구는 8가지 화두 이 기사는 8월 31일 오전 08시08분 '해외 주식 투자의 도우미' GAM(Global Asset Management)에 출고된 프리미엄 기사입니다. GAM에서 회원 가입을 하면 9000여 해외 종목의 프리미엄 기사를 보실 수 있습니다. 이 기사는 인공지능(AI) 번역을 바탕으로 전문 기자들의 검증과 분석을 거쳐 생산된 콘텐츠입니다. 원문은 8월28일 블룸버그통신 기사(Carry Trades to Treasury Twists: A Guide to the Hot Debates on Wall Street)입니다. [서울=뉴스핌] 이홍규 기자 = 케빈 워시 연방준비제도(연준) 의장과 스콧 베선트 미국 재무장관이 잇달아 시선을 끄는 정책 결정을 내리면서 투자자들은 올여름 한산한 시기를 누리지 못했다. 베선트 장관이 이끄는 재무부는 엔화 강세를 유도하고 장기 차입비용을 억제하기 위해 예상치 못한 시장 개입을 단행했다. 투자자들은 중동 전쟁에 따른 불확실성도 여전히 감당해야 하는 상황에서 새로운 거래 기법에 눈을 돌리는 한편 당국이 반영해야 할 새로운 전략을 구사하고 있는지를 두고 논쟁을 벌이고 있다. 이 과정에서 다양한 거래 기법과 이론이 뒤섞여 제시되고 있다. 이에 트레이딩 데스크에서 가장 뜨겁게 논의되는 주제들의 배경과 현재 상황, 향후 전망을 짚어본다. 본드 스티프너(Bond Steepener) 미국 국채 수익률 곡선의 장기물 금리는 인플레이션이 좀처럼 꺾이지 않는 가운데 연방정부 재정적자가 확대되고 인공지능(AI) 투자 자금 조달을 위한 회사채 발행이 늘면서 국채와 경쟁하는 구도가 형성되며 올해 상승했다. 연준이 인플레이션 억제를 위해 금리를 인상할지 여부에 대한 불확실성도 장기채 보유에 대한 우려를 키운 요인으로 작용했다. 30년물 국채 수익률이 2007년 이후 처음으로 해당 수준까지 오르면서 월가에서는 장기물 국채 가치가 단기물 대비 하락할 것이라는 전망이 강화됐다. 이런 현상은 커브 스티프닝(curve steepening)으로 불린다. 재무부가 8월 10년물부터 30년물까지의 국채에 대한 재매입(바이백) 규모를 최소 두 배로 늘리겠다고 밝혔음에도 이런 전망은 유지되고 있다. 해당 발표 이후 장기물 국채 수익률은 하락했지만 골드만삭스그룹(GS)과 웰스파고(WFC)의 금리 전략가들은 장기 수익률이 높은 수준을 유지할 것으로 내다보고 있다. 캐리 트레이드(Carry Trade) 캐리 트레이드는 금리가 낮은 통화로 저렴하게 자금을 조달한 뒤 이를 훨씬 높은 금리를 제공하는 국가의 통화로 전환하는 고위험 거래를 의미한다. 신흥국 8개 통화 기준 블룸버그 누적 외환 캐리트레이드 지수 분기별 추이 [자료=블룸버그통신] 이 거래는 신흥국 금리가 주요국 대비 높고 신흥국 통화가 달러, 유로, 엔 등 주로 차입에 활용되는 통화 대비 안정적이거나 강세를 보일 때 활발해진다. 이 거래는 7개 분기 연속으로 플러스 수익률을 기록해 2008년 이후 가장 긴 상승세를 이어갔다. 다만 2024년 여름 일본은행이 기준금리를 인상했을 당시처럼 이 거래는 빠르게 반전될 수 있다. 디베이스먼트 트레이드(Debasement Trade) 디베이스먼트 트레이드는 달러 가치 하락 우려로 투자자들이 달러를 매도하고 금이나 비트코인처럼 공급량이 제한된 자산으로 옮겨가는 현상을 뜻한다. 이 용어는 잉글랜드의 헨리 8세나 로마 황제 네로처럼 금화와 은화에 구리 등 값싼 금속을 섞어 화폐 가치를 떨어뜨린, 이른바 화폐 개악(debasement)을 단행했던 역사적 사례에서 비롯됐다. 현대적 의미에서는 미국의 부채가 40조달러를 넘어선 데다 인플레이션이 지속되면서 시간이 지날수록 달러 구매력이 잠식될 것이라는 우려로 투자자들이 달러를 경계하는 현상을 가리킨다. 미국 정책 당국이 의도적으로든 실수로든 달러 약세를 유발하는 정책을 추진하고 있다는 의구심도 한몫하고 있다. 디베이스먼트 트레이드에 대한 논의는 2025년 도널드 트럼프 대통령의 관세 정책과 미국 정부 셧다운 가능성 등을 계기로 확산됐다. 이후 2026년 중반 베선트 장관이 엔화와 미국 장기 국채를 지지하기 위한 시장 개입을 승인하면서 월가에서 다시 논쟁으로 떠올랐다. 미국 재무부의 국채 바이백 계획 발표 전후 블룸버그 달러스팟 지수 추이 [자료=블룸버그통신] 다만 달러 약세가 나타날 때마다 이를 모두 디베이스먼트로 해석할 수는 없다. 전세계 투자자들이 여전히 미국 국채를 대규모로 보유하고 있다는 점은 달러 표시 자산에 대한 전면적인 이탈이 나타나고 있지 않음을 시사한다. 탈달러화(De-Dollarization) 디베이스먼트가 달러 가치에 대한 우려를 반영하는 개념이라면 탈달러화는 달러 의존도를 낮추는 행위 자체에 초점을 맞춘다. 여기에는 중앙은행이 외환보유액에서 달러 비중을 축소하거나 기업이 달러가 아닌 통화로 채권을 발행하거나 전세계 투자자들이 자금을 미국 밖 시장으로 이동시키는 행위 등이 포함된다. 전세계 외환보유액에서 달러가 차지하는 비중은 1999년 약 70%에서 최근 60% 미만으로 상당폭 낮아졌다. 각국 중앙은행들이 장기적으로 달러 익스포저를 줄이겠다는 방침을 밝히는 가운데 유로화와 위안화가 매력적인 대안으로 꼽히면서 이런 흐름에 힘을 보태고 있다. 탈달러화 논의는 2022년 러시아의 우크라이나 침공 이후 본격화됐다. 미국이 러시아 자산을 동결하고 달러 기반 금융 시스템에 대한 접근을 제한하면서 미국이 자국의 금융 시스템과 통화를 무기화할 수 있는 능력에 관심이 쏠렸다. 다만 미국 증시는 여전히 전세계 주식시장 시가총액의 약 절반을 차지하고 있으며 미국 채권시장 규모도 세계 최대다. 달러의 우위는 시장의 깊이와 미국 경제 규모, 그리고 이를 진정으로 대체할 만한 통화가 없다는 점에 뒷받침되고 있다. 금융억압(Financial Repression) 금융억압은 1973년 스탠퍼드대 경제학자 로널드 매키넌과 에드워드 쇼가 만든 용어로 정부가 저축을 국채나 특정 우대 차입자에게 유도해 차입비용을 인위적으로 낮게 유지하는 정책을 뜻한다. 이런 정책은 2차 세계대전 이후 미국과 유럽, 일본에서 광범위하게 시행됐다. 자본 통제, 금리 상한제, 금융기관의 국채 보유 의무화 등이 대표적인 사례다. 채권 보유자들의 수익률을 낮춤으로써 정부는 과중한 부채 부담을 줄일 수 있었다. 실제로 연준은 2차 세계대전 기간과 종전 이후 단기 국채 수익률에 상한을 뒀다. 이 조치는 1951년 재무부-연준 협정 체결로 종료됐다. 억만장자 투자자 스탠리 드러켄밀러를 비롯한 일부 투자자들은 베선트 장관의 국채 재매입을 정부 차입비용을 억누르기 위한 금융억압의 한 형태로 평가하고 있다. 관련된 개념으로 재정 우위(fiscal dominance)가 있다. 이는 부채 규모가 큰 상황에서 중앙은행이 인플레이션 억제 대신 정부의 저비용 차입 지원 쪽으로 방향을 트는 것을 의미한다. 이 경우 결과적으로 인플레이션이 다시 자극될 수 있다. 트위스트(The Twist) 베선트 장관의 재매입 전략이 실질적으로 장기채를 단기채로 대체하는 효과를 낸다면 이는 연준이 수십 년간 여러 차례 시행해온 오퍼레이션 트위스트(Operation Twist)의 재무부 버전에 해당한다. 연준의 오퍼레이션 트위스트는 중앙은행 포트폴리오 내 단기 국채를 장기 국채로 교체하는 방식으로 진행됐다. 이를 통해 장기 차입비용을 낮추고 경제성장을 뒷받침하는 것이 목표였다. 베선트 장관은 자신이 트레저리 트위스트를 시행하고 있다고 밝혔다. 이 전략을 통해 단기 국채(T-Bill) 비중을 25%까지 끌어올리고 수익률을 낮출 수 있다는 분석도 나온다. 도이체방크(DB)의 조지 사라벨로스 외환리서치 글로벌 총괄은 재매입 계획 발표 이후 "오퍼레이션 트위스트가 시작됐다"며 "재무부는 시장에서 듀레이션을 제거하기 위한 자금을 마련하려면 단기 국채 발행을 늘려야 할 것"이라고 말했다. 그는 이를 사실상 "연성 금융억압"이라고 덧붙였다. 일각에서는 이런 조치를 베선트 풋(Bessent Put)이라고 부른다. 풋옵션은 매수자가 정해진 가격에 특정 자산을 매도할 수 있는 권리를 뜻한다. 이 경우 시장에 대규모 매수자가 존재한다는 사실을 트레이더들이 인지하고 있어 이에 맞서는 거래를 꺼리는 상황을 가리킨다. 셀 아메리카(Sell America) 정책 및 정치적 불확실성이 커지면서 일부에서는 트럼프 대통령의 2기 집권 기간 투자자들이 결국 셀 아메리카(Sell America)로 향하고 있다는 관측을 내놓고 있다. 그 배경으로는 관세 정책, 제롬 파월 전 연준 의장 재임 당시 연준을 겨냥한 압박, 그린란드 병합 언급으로 인한 전통적 동맹 관계 훼손 등이 꼽힌다. 국가부채 증가와 같은 근본적인 취약 요인도 이런 흐름에 더해지고 있다. 30년물 국채 수익률은 8월 거의 20년 만에 최고 수준까지 상승했다. 같은 기간 달러 가치를 나타내는 지수는 지난해 약 8% 하락했다. 다만 해외의 미국 국채 보유액은 올해 사상 최대치를 기록했고 미국 증시도 인공지능(AI)을 비롯한 기술 분야에서 미국이 주도하는 발전에 힘입어 잇달아 사상 최고치를 새로 썼다. 수익률곡선통제(Yield Curve Control) 장기채 재매입 규모를 늘리려는 재무부의 조치는 시장 원리에 따라 금리 수준이 결정되도록 두지 않고 당국이 차입비용을 인위적으로 낮게 유지하려는 정책과 이미 비교되고 있다. 미국·일본·독일·영국 10년물 국채 금리 추이 [자료=블룸버그통신] RBC블루베이를 비롯한 일부 투자자들은 국채 수익률이 통제 범위를 벗어날 경우 트럼프 행정부가 어디까지 개입할지, 그리고 이것이 결국 연준에 금리 억제를 위한 압박으로 작용할지를 두고 의문을 제기하고 있다. 연준은 이런 압박에 맞서 독립성을 지킬 것으로 예상된다. 워시 의장이 오랫동안 자산 매입 활용과 재정·통화 정책 간 경계가 모호해지는 현상에 의문을 제기해온 점도 이런 전망에 힘을 싣는다. 연준의 협조 없이는 베선트 장관이 이끄는 재무부가 차입비용을 실질적으로 억제하기 위해 막대한 재원을 투입해야 할 것으로 보인다. 일본이 2016년부터 2024년까지 시행한 수익률곡선통제(YCC) 정책의 엇갈린 성과는 반면교사로 꼽힌다. 당시 일본은행은 10년물 국채 수익률 방어에 나섰지만 그 결과 엔화 가치가 사상 최저 수준까지 떨어지는 결과로 이어졌다. bernard0202@newspim.com 2026-08-31 08:11
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